

End-to-end Injection Safety at Scale Mike Samuel, Google Security Engineering

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Security engineer @ Google

Hacks libraries, tools, languages

TC39 member (JavaScript language committee)

Editor of "A Roadmap for Node.js Security"

Mission: make the easiest way to express an idea in code, a secure way



Trusted Types



- W3 Proposal
- Builds on 6+ years of experience within Google
- Protects Gmail, many other complex apps
- Evidence of efficacy

Trusted Types

- 1. Problem statement
- 2. Small change

 big organizational effect
- 3. Adoption in practice
- 4. Early adopters welcome

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"Today, a novice programmer cannot write a complex but secure application."

Breaking XSS mitigations via Script Gadgets - blackhat 2017



What are Script Gadgets?

A Script Gadget is an *existing* JS code on the page that may be used to bypass mitigations:

```
<div data-role="button" data-text="I am a button"></div>
[...]
<script>
  var buttons = $("[data-role=button]");
  buttons.html(buttons.attr("data-text"));
</script>
<div data-role="button" ... >I am a button</div>
```









What are Script Gadgets?

A Script Gadget is an *existing* JS code on the page that may be used to bypass mitigations:

```
XSS <div data-role="button"
data-text="<script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;"></div>XSS
<script>
  var buttons = $("[data-role=button]");
  buttons.html(buttons.attr("data-text"));
</script>
<div data-role="button" ... ><script>alert(1)</script></div>
```









So what? Why should I care?

- Gadgets are present in all but one of the tested popular web frameworks.
- Gadgets can be used to bypass most mitigations in modern web applications.
- We automatically created exploits for 20% of web **applications** from Alexa top 5,000.



"Today, a novice programmer cannot write a complex but secure application."

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Reduce developers' security burden.

Move it to security professionals.



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Client-side JavaScript

<div id=foo></div> <script> var foo = document.querySelector('#foo'); foo.innerHTML = 'raw-string'; </script>



Client-side JavaScript

<meta http-equiv=... content="trusted-types p" /> <div id=foo></div> <script> var foo = document.querySelector('#foo'); foo.innerHTML = 'raw-string'; </script>

O Ducaught TypeError: Failed to set the 'innerHTML' property on 'Element': This document requires 'TrustedHTML' assignment. at demo2.html:9





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<meta http-equiv=... content="trusted-types p" />

<div id=foo></div> <script> var foo = document.querySelector('#foo'); var policy = TrustedTypes.createPolicy('p', {}); var trusted = policy.createHTML('raw-string'); foo.innerHTML = trusted; </script>







Step 1. Flip the switch

- Trust decisions
 Implicit
- No separation btw. sensitive and other code
- Un-undoable acts not checked
- Bugs non-obvious
- Fails unsafe



- Trust decisions Implicit
- No separation btw. sensitive and other code
- Un-undoable acts
 checked
- Bugs **obvious**
- Fails **safe**



Step 2. Consolidate tricky code

- Trust decisions
 Implicit
- No separation btw. sensitive and other code
- Un-undoable acts checked
- Bugs obvious
- Fails safe



- Trust decisions **explicit**
- **Separation** btw. sensitive and other code
- Un-undoable acts checked
- Bugs obvious, **fewer**
- Fails safe
- Sensitive code not scrutinized



Step 3. Automatically loop in reviewers

- Trust decisions explicit
- Separation btw. sensitive and other code
- Un-undoable acts checked
- Bugs obvious, fewer
- Fails safe
- Sensitive code not scrutinized



- Trust decisions explicit
- Separation btw. sensitive and other code
- Un-undoable acts checked
- Bugs obvious, fewer
- Fails safe
- Sensitive code
 scrutinized



Lightweight process

help.github.com/en/articles/about-code-owners "Code owners are automatically requested for review when someone opens a pull request that modifies code that they own."

CODEOWNERS # Files under sensitive/ need extra sign-off sensitive/ @securityperson





Stay on the bleeding edge — join our Gitter room!





See how the exact same Medium.com clone (called Conduit) is built using any of our supported frontends and backends. Yes, you can mix and match them, because they all adhere to the same API spec 😮 😎



public/index.html

- k rel="stylesheet" href="//demo.productionready.io/main.css">
- 8 k href="//code.ionicframework.com/ionicons/2.0.1/css/ionicons.min.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
- 9 <link href="//fonts.googleapis.com/css?</pre>
 - family=Titillium+Web:700|Source+Serif+Pro:400,700|Merriweather+Sans:400,700|Sou rce+Sans+Pro:400,300,600,700,300italic,400italic,600italic,700italic" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
- 10 <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="trusted-types default + react-article-markup">
- 11 <script src="https://wicg.github.io/trusted-</pre> + types/dist/es6/trustedtypes.build.js"></script>
- 12 <!---
- 13 Notice the use of %PUBLIC_URL% in the tag above.
- 14 It will be replaced with the URL of the `public` folder during the

src/components/Article/index.js

- import { connect } from 'react-redux'; 5
- 6 import marked from 'marked';
- import { ARTICLE_PAGE_LOADED, ARTICLE_PAGE_UNLOADED } from
 - '../../constants/actionTypes';
- +import { createReactPolicy } from '../../trustedtypes'; 8

```
10
     const mapStateToProps = state => ({
```

class Article extends React. Component {

```
....state.article,
```

9

11

```
19
          dispatch({ type: ARTICLE_PAGE_UNLOADED })
20
     });
21
    +const markedSanitizedPolicy = createReactPolicy('article-markup', {
22
23
            createHTML: (s) => marked(s, { sanitize: true }),
    +
24
    +});
25
    +
26
```

e

src/components/Article/index.js

35	return null;
36	}
37	
38	<pre>- const markup = {html: marked(this.props.article.body,</pre>
	<pre>}) };</pre>
39 40	<pre>const canModify = this_props_currentUser && return null;</pre>
41	}
42	
43	<pre>+ const markup = {html:</pre>
	<pre>markedSanitizedPolicy.createHTML(this.props.article.body) };</pre>
44	<pre>const canModify = this.props.currentUser &&</pre>
45	<pre>this.props.currentUser.username === this.props.article.</pre>
46	roturn (

{ sanitize: true

author.username;

RealWorld React App src/index.js

13	+// Allow http: and https: URLs
14	+createDefaultPolicy({
15	+ createURL: function(s) {
16	<pre>+ const u = new URL(s, document.baseURI);</pre>
17	<pre>+ if (['http:', 'https:'].includes(u.protocol)) {</pre>
18	+ return s;
19	+ }
20	<pre>+ throw new TypeError('Invalid URL!');</pre>
21	+ },
22	+});
23	+

src/trustedtypes.js

- +// Dummy policies 1
- 2 +let createReactPolicy = (name, rules) => rules;
- 3 +let createDefaultPolicy = (rules) => {};

```
4
    +
```

- 5 +if (window.TrustedTypes) {
- 6 + createDefaultPolicy = (rules) => window.TrustedTypes.createPolicy('default', rules, true);
 - + createReactPolicy = (name, rules) =>

```
window.TrustedTypes.createPolicy('react-' + name, rules);
```

8 +}

+

9

10

```
+export { createReactPolicy, createDefaultPolicy }; @#
```

Google

Tools Integration

Most trust decisions in common infrastructure that is safe-by-construction:

- Template Systems (strict, contextually autoescaped)
- Sanitizers
- Programmatic Builder APIs
- Protobufs bridge server- and client-side trusted values.



Gets security eyes on decisions to trust

Long experience migrating projects Reduces XSS payments to vulnerability hunters

Proposed as web standard Available in Chrome with origin trial token Contributors in Munich, NY, Prague, Seattle, Zürich

Resources

- Early adopters: <u>trusted-types@googlegroups.com</u>
- Specification: <u>github.com/WICG/trusted-types</u>
- "Securing the Tangled Web" by C. Kern, ACM Queue 2014



(Ask me about tools integration)

Google