MinBFT, Hyperledger Lab
Open Source Project to Develop Efficient Consensus Protocol

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NEC Corporation
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Agenda

Introduction
Blockchain and Consensus Protocol
MinBFT Protocol
Approach
Implementation
Introduction

- NEC involved in R&D of blockchain technologies since 2012
- This project originates from NEC’s internal research initiative
- To discover efficient practical consensus algorithms
- To raise awareness about the benefits of TEE for BFT protocols
Hyperledger

- Project hosted by The Linux Foundation
- Hyperledger is an open source collaborative effort created to advance cross-industry blockchain technologies
- It is a global collaboration, including leaders in finance, banking, Internet of Things, supply chains, manufacturing and Technology.

https://www.hyperledger.org/
Hyperledger Labs

A space for innovation and testing of ideas.

Hyperledger Labs will allow teams to experiment with new frameworks or new modules without the promise of stable code or MVP

We have launched MinBFT lab here in August 2018

https://github.com/hyperledger-labs/minbft

https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/labs
Blockchain and Consensus Protocol
Blockchain

Bitcoin (2009)
- A cryptocurrency
- Decentralized: peer-to-peer, without a trusted authority or central server

Blockchain
- Introduced as a ledger (a distributed database) in Bitcoin
- Generalized not only for cryptocurrencies
- Many (open source) implementations
  - Fabric, Sawtooth, Iroha (these are in Hyperledger project [1]) , Ethereum [2] etc.

Blockchain and Consensus Protocol

Blockchain involves a consensus protocol

Role in Blockchain
  - Make an agreement
    - In Bitcoin, agreement on ownership of a coin to prevent “double-spending”
    - In general, agreement on order of transactions, result, ...

Requirements in Blockchain
  - Tolerance for Byzantine failure
Failure models

- Crash failure
  - Stops responding
- Byzantine failure
  - Arbitrary behavior
    - Responds with a lie, etc.
  - Hard to tolerate

Behavior of a malicious attacker in a Blockchain network is modeled as Byzantine failure

- Blockchain relies on a Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocol
BFT Consensus Protocol in Blockchain

Proof of Work (PoW)
- Used in Bitcoin
- Suitable for public blockchains ("open" network like Bitcoin): scalable to thousands of nodes, but no finality

Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
- Used in Hyperledger Fabric (version 0.6)
- Suitable for private blockchains: (relatively) high performance and finality, but limited scalability
- Focus on this in my presentation
PBFT: Protocol

0. A node is elected as the primary node in the network to accept client request

1. The primary node multicasts PREPREPARE messages to the other nodes, in which a sequence number is also assigned to the message along with a signature

2. Upon reception of the PREPREPARE message, each node validates the signature

3. They multicast a PREPARE message that confirms the PREPREPARE message

4. A node receives $2f$ PREPARE messages that match the PRE-PRE-PREPARE message, multicasts a COMMIT message

5. A node receives $2f + 1$ COMMIT messages that the PREPARE message, it executes the request
MinBFT
Limitations in PBFT
- Performance
- Scalability: scales to few tens of nodes

MinBFT proposed by G. S. Veronese et al. in 2013
- Leverage a secure hardware to make the protocol efficient so that overcome the limitations
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)

- An implementation of the "secure hardware" or Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
- Introduced with 6th generation Intel Processors (Skylake) in 2015
- Provides an isolated environment ("enclave") for storing sensitive data and running codes
  - Preserve confidentiality and integrity of the data and code
  - Even software running at higher privilege levels can neither access nor modify the data
**Intel SGX in MinBFT: Contents of Enclave**

### Data
- A monotonic counter
- A private key

### Code
1. **Assigning a sequence number to a message**
   - Increment the counter and assign its value to a request in a primary node

2. **Signing a message**
   - Create a prepare message with the sequence number and a signature by a private key in the enclave

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**Diagram:**
- **Request** from a client
- **Primary Node**
  - **Enclave**
    - **Counter**
    - **Private key**
  - **Prepare message**
    - To backup nodes
      - (Signature will be verified)
Guarantees by Intel SGX

- A primary never assign a sequence number $n$ to different requests $m_1$ and $m_2$
  - A counter for sequence numbers is in an enclave; it cannot be interfered
- A sequence number $n$ assigned to a request $m$, which is described in a prepare message is issued by a primary
  - The prepare message is signed and the signing is processed in an enclave (the private key is protected)
- All backups receive the same combination $<m, n>$ (prevent equivocation)
Backup nodes can trust a sequence number assigned by a primary node
- In PBFT, all backup nodes need to confirm everyone received the same sequence number by broadcasting a message in the prepare phase.

MinBFT can omit the phase under the above condition.
Intel SGX in MinBFT: Effects (3)

Reduction of total nodes

- MinBFT requires \(2f + 1\) nodes to tolerate \(f\) faulty while PBFT requires \(3f + 1\) nodes
  - \(f\) nodes could be faulty; the system needs to proceed with \((n - f)\) replies
  - The \((n - f)\) replies could contain up to \(f\) malicious replies
  - Therefore a node expect at most \(((n - f) - f) = n - 2f\) correct replies
  - In PBFT, this must be majority: \(n - 2f > f\) therefore \(n \geq 3f + 1\)
  - In MinBFT, this must be at least one (Intel SGX guarantees every nodes receive same requests): \(n - 2f \geq 1\) therefore \(n \geq 2f + 1\)

\(f = 1\) because cannot tell failure and delay

Correct replies are at most \(n - 2f\)
MinBFT: Protocol

0. A node is elected as the primary node in the network to accept client request
1. The primary node broadcasts PREPARE messages to the other nodes, in which a sequence number is also assigned to the message along with a signature by the secure hardware
2. Upon reception of the PREPARE message, each nodes validates the signature as well as the sequence number to see if it is incremental
3. They broadcast a COMMIT message that confirms the PREPARE message
4. A node receives $f + 1$ COMMIT message, it executes the request
PBFT vs. MinBFT

Comparison
- MinBFT can reduce total number of nodes and communication rounds by leveraging a secure hardware
- The efficiency increases system throughput

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBFT</th>
<th>EBFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure Hardware</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Nodes</td>
<td>$3f + 1$</td>
<td>$2f + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Rounds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Nodes
- PBFT: 4 (for $f = 1$)
- EBFT: 3

Communication Rounds
- PBFT: Pre-prepare → Prepare → Commit
- EBFT: Prepare → Commit
Approach

Objectives
Scope
Status
**Approach**

### Objectives

- **Pluggable software component**
- **Clean design**
  - Modularity
  - Testability
- **Easy integration**
  - Abstract interfaces
  - Simple blockchain-like example
- **Best practices**
  - Embedded documentation
  - Unit and integration tests
  - Automatic code quality check (linting)
  - Continuous integration
Approach

Scope

Core components
- Core MinBFT protocol
- USIG service
- Client functionality

External components (sample code)
- Authentication
- Network connectivity
- Configuration
- CLI application to run a replica/client instance
Approach

Status

Experimental development stage
Hyperledger Lab
Features implemented
- Normal case operation
- SGX USIG
- Simple blockchain-like example

Features considered
- View change operation (under development)
- Garbage collection and checkpoints
- USIG enclave attestation
- Faulty node recovery
- Documentation improvement
- Testing improvement
Implementation

Details
Structure
USIG
Implementation

Details

Language
- Most of the code in Go
- SGX enclave in C

Core dependencies
- Go v1.11
- golang/protobuf v1.1
- Intel® SGX SDK for Linux v2.4
- Tested on Ubuntu 18.04 LTS

Licence
- Source code under Apache Licence 2.0
- Documentation under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Implementation

Structure

- **api** – definition of API between core and external components
- **client** – implementation of client-side part of the protocol
- **core** – implementation of core consensus protocol
- **usig** – implementation of USIG, tamper-proof component
- **messages** – definition of the protocol messages
- **sample** – sample implementation of external interfaces
  - **authentication** - generation and verification of authentication tags
    - **keytool** – tool to generate sample key set file
  - **net** – network connectivity
  - **config** – consensus configuration provider
  - **requestconsumer** – service executing ordered requests
  - **peer** – CLI application to run a replica/client instance
Implementation

USIG

- Intel ® SGX enclave as tamperproof component
- USIG-Sign using ECDSA (FIPS 186-3) signature
- Private key generated inside enclave and protected by SGX
- Key pair can be sealed and stored permanently
- Remote attestation can be decoupled from consensus instantiation
- No dependency on SGX Monotonic Counter (Trusted Platform Service)
- Ephemeral counter value
- Ephemeral unique epoch value for each enclave instance
- USIG identity as key pair combined with epoch value
Contributing

Any feedback highly appreciated
- Questions
- Suggestions
- Bug reports
- Change requests etc.

GitHub issue or pull request, as appropriate
References

- Hyperledger Lab: https://github.com/hyperledger-labs/minbft
- Efficient BFT Paper: https://goo.gl/oQs43M
- Efficient BFT Proof: https://goo.gl/tMxSrs
- NEC Activities on Blockchain: https://goo.gl/aDGyZM
- NEC Laboratories Europe GmbH: http://www.neclab.eu/