Establishing Image Provenance and Security in Kubernetes

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KATFIGO 14G

MATTE GOTYG

Know What The F* Is Going On In Your Cluster**

For every image in our cluster, we should be able to answer:

- What is it?
- Where did it come from?
- How can I rebuild it?
- Does it have any known vulnerabilities?
- Is it up-to-date?

Can we prove the answers?

What is it?

- Where did it come from?
- How can I rebuild it?
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- Is it up-to-date?

"Docker will do to apt what apt did to tar"

Bryan Cantrill
Joyent

@bcantrill

Kubectl Output

```
$ kubectl get pods --all-namespaces
```

NAMESPACE NAME ...

default blog-7886fbf79b-mvndx

default db-75d77f7c88-tpkwr

default proxy-c65d78cbc-b5lq2

kube-system event-exporter-v0.2.1-5f5b89fcc8-65dxs

kube-system fluentd-gcp-scaler-7c5db745fc-rjfwf

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. . .



@adrianmouat Container Solutions

ENVUARS





Kubernetes views tags as immutable Docker views tags as mutable

Both are useful.

@adrianmouat

Tagging Images

- Treat production images as immutable
 - Git Hash
 - Full version number
 - Digest

Environment Variables

```
$ kubectl exec proxy-c65d78cbc-b51q2 env
...
NGINX_VERSION=1.15.5-1~stretch
NJS_VERSION=1.15.5.0.2.4-1~stretch
...
```

Environment Variables

- Limited
- Not structured/standardised
- Mixes config and metadata
- Labels were meant to fix this!
 - (And annotations)

Labels

```
S cat Dockerfile
ARG VCS_REF
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.revision=$VCS_REF \
      org.opencontainers.image.source= \
         "https://github.com/ContainerSolutions/trow"
$ docker build -t amouat/trow \
     --build-arg VCS_REF=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD) .
```

Labels

```
$ docker inspect -f "{{json .ContainerConfig.Labels}}" \
          amouat/trow | jq .
{
          "org.opencontainers.image.revision": "fef36bd",
          "org.opencontainers.image.source":
"https://github.com/ContainerSolutions/trow"
}
```

Annotations

- Defined in OCI Image Spec
- Technically different to Labels
- "Pre-Defined Annotation Keys"

Pre-Defined Annotation Keys

This specification defines the following annotation keys, intended for but not limited to image index and image manifest authors:

- org.opencontainers.image.created date and time on which the image was built (string, date-time as defined by RFC 3339).
- org.opencontainers.image.authors contact details of the people or organization responsible for the image (freeform string)
- org.opencontainers.image.url URL to find more information on the image (string)
- org.opencontainers.image.documentation URL to get documentation on the image (string)
- org.opencontainers.image.source URL to get source code for building the image (string)
- · org.opencontainers.image.version version of the packaged software
 - The version MAY match a label or tag in the source code repository
 - version MAY be Semantic versioning-compatible
- · org.opencontainers.image.revision Source control revision identifier for the packaged software.
- org.opencontainers.image.vendor Name of the distributing entity, organization or individual.
- org.opencontainers.image.licenses License(s) under which contained software is distributed as an SPDX License Expression.
- org.opencontainers.image.ref.name Name of the reference for a target (string).
 - o SHOULD only be considered valid when on descriptors on index. json within image layout.
 - o Character set of the value SHOULD conform to alphanum of A-Za-z0-9 and separator set of -._:@/+
 - The reference must match the following grammar:

```
ref ::= component ("/" component)*
component ::= alphanum (separator alphanum)*
alphanum ::= [A-Za-z0-9]+
separator ::= [-._:@+] | "--"
```

- org.opencontainers.image.title Human-readable title of the image (string)
- org.opencontainers.image.description Human-readable description of the software packaged in the image (string)

Annotations

- Currently unsupported by build tools
- Just use Labels
 - And predefined keys

Annotations

Hopes for the future:

- Better support in Kubernetes
- Better support in build tooling
- Greater awareness and use

Metadata DB

- Store information on images
- Keyed by digest
- Can be updated with events
- Build data, contents and versions, known vulns



Grafeas

What about the Registry?

- Would like to:
 - Search for all tags for digest
 - Have audit information
 - Plus other metadata

- What is it?
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"Reproducibility is a virtue"

Dinah McNutt

Google Release Engineer @dinahSBR

Reproducible Docker Builds

- Use tagged base images
 - or digests
- Version package installed software
 - run a mirror for total control

Downloading Software

- Be careful when using curl/wget
 - Use GPG to verify signatures
 - Checksums

Binary Reproducibility

- File timestamps
- Other metadata
 - Build container IDs
 - Created timestamp



Bazel

Distroless

- Base Images from Google
- Only contain runtime dependencies
- No package manager or shell
- Great for vulnerability scans
- And reducing image size

So we should all use Bazel?

- Err, probably not:
 - It's big and complicated
 - Wants to build all your stuff
 - Large learning curve
 - Docs need work

- What is it?
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Up-to-date vs Stable

- Tension
 - Don't want breaking changes
 - Do want bug-fixes!
- Good test suite
- Semantic versioning
 - Pin to minor version (4.1.x)

Library Dependencies

- Generally tooling available
 - Maven display-plugin-updates
 - NPM updtr

Base Images

- Easy to use out-of-date base images
- Constant rebuilds?
- Hooks?


- Digests are great
 - Content hashes
 - Unwieldy
- GPG signing useful

Notary


- Complete signing solution
- TOFU
- Implements TUF
- Protects against range of attacks
 - Including replay attacks


Only run images from a controlled registry

Not easily possibleShould be



More *holistic* solutions





More tooling



Grafeas





Trow.io

Image Management for Kubernetes Clusters

KWTFIGOIYC

- Use immutable tags
- Use Labels
- Use Tools
 - Notary, registries, scanners

References

- Trow <u>https://trow.io</u>
- Grafeas https://grafeas.io/
- OCI Annotations
 https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/blob/master/annotations.md
- Release Engineering (from Google SRE Book)
 https://landing.google.com/sre/book/chapters/release-engineering.html
- AlwaysPullImages Admission Controller https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/admission-controllers/#alwayspullimages
- ImageStreams in OpenShift https://blog.openshift.com/image-streams-fag/
- Docker EE https://www.docker.com/enterprise-edition
- Notary https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary
- Weave Flux https://www.weave.works/oss/flux/
- Clair <u>https://github.com/coreos/clair</u>
- Aqua https://www.aquasec.com/
- NeuVector https://neuvector.com/
- Twistlock https://www.twistlock.com/
- Bazel <u>https://bazel.build/</u>
- Kaniko https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/kaniko

Workspace File

```
load("@bazel_tools//tools/build_defs/repo:http.bzl", "http_archive")
http_archive(
    name = "io_bazel_rules_docker",
    sha256 = "29d109605e0d6f9c892584f07275b8c9260803bf0c6fcb7de2623b2bedc910bd".
    strip_prefix = "rules_docker-0.5.1",
    urls = ["https://github.com/bazelbuild/rules_docker/archive/v0.5.1.tar.gz"],)
load(
    "@io_bazel_rules_docker//container:container.bzl",
    "container_pull", "container_image",
    container_repositories = "repositories",)
```

Build File Pt 1

```
load("@io_bazel_rules_docker//go:image.bzl",
     "go_image")
go_image(
  name = "foo",
  srcs = ["code/main.go"],
  goarch = "amd64",
  goos = "linux",
  pure = "on",
```

Build File Pt 2

```
load("@io_bazel_rules_docker//container:container
.bzl", "container_push")
container_push(
  name = "publish",
  image = ":foo",
  format = "Docker",
  registry = "index.docker.io",
  repository = "amouat/go-example",
  tag = "test",)
```

Bazel Run

```
$ bazel run //:publish
INFO: Analysed target //:publish (1 packages loaded).
INFO: Found 1 target...
Target //:publish up-to-date:
  bazel-bin/publish
INFO: Elapsed time: 0.430s, Critical Path: 0.02s
INFO: 0 processes.
INFO: Build completed successfully, 1 total action
INFO: Build completed successfully, 1 total action
index.docker.io/amouat/go-example:test was published with
digest:
sha256:0f2c5d8cdefc0b74eafce7fc65064a734c16770f7401331043f68d10
893f9bc6
```

Bazel Run

```
$ bazel clean
```

INFO: Starting clean (this may take a while). Consider using --async if the clean takes more than several minutes.

\$ bazel run //:publish

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index.docker.io/amouat/go-example:test was published with
digest:

sha256:0f2c5d8cdefc0b74eafce7fc65064a734c16770f7401331043f68d10 893f9bc6

Bazel Output

```
$ docker save amouat/go-example:test -o test.tar
$ tar tvf test.tar
             710 1970-01-01 01:00
-rw-r--r-- 0/0
5d629c1a7df55c2c46...688a29340.json
              0 1970-01-01 01:00
drwxr-xr-x 0/0
b8e07a381fbd8ca7c0...3eda96f8d3/
              3 1970-01-01 01:00
-rw-r--r-- 0/0
b8e07a381fbd8ca7c0...96f8d3/VERSION
$ docker inspect -f "{{.Created}}" amouat/go-example:test
1970-01-01T00:00:00Z
```