Making C Less Dangerous

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https://outflux.net/slides/2018/lss/danger.pdf

Agenda

- Background
 - Kernel Self Protection Project
 - C as a fancy assembler
- Towards less dangerous C
 - Variable Length Arrays are bad and slow
 - Explicit switch case fall-through
 - Always-initialized automatic variables
 - Arithmetic overflow detection
 - Hope for bounds checking
 - Control Flow Integrity: forward edges
 - Control Flow Integrity: backward edges
 - Where are we now?
 - How you can help

000-005 Unexplained Phenomena, Software Programming

Kernel Self Protection Project

- https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project
- KSPP focuses on the kernel protecting the *kernel* from attack (e.g. refcount overflow) rather than the kernel protecting *userspace* from attack (e.g. execve brute force detection) but any area of related development is welcome
- Currently ~12 organizations and ~10 individuals working on about ~20 technologies
- Slow and steady



C as a fancy assembler: **almost machine code**

- The kernel wants to be as fast and small as possible
- At the core, kernel wants to do very architecture-specific things for memory management, interrupt handling, scheduling, ...
- No C API for setting up page tables, switching to 64-bit mode ...

```
/* Enable the boot page tables */
leal pgtable(%ebx), %eax
movl %eax, %cr3

/* Enable Long mode in EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
movl $MSR_EFER, %ecx
rdmsr
btsl $_EFER_LME, %eax
wrmsr
```


C as a fancy assembler: undefined behavior

- The C langauge comes with some operational baggage, and weak "standard" libraries
 - What are the contents of "uninitialized" variables?
 - ... whatever was in memory from before now!
 - void pointers have no type yet we can call typed functions through them?
 - ... assembly doesn't care: everything can be an address to call!
 - Why does memcpy() have no "max destination length" argument?
 - ... just do what I say; memory areas are all the same!
- "With undefined behavior, anything is possible!"
 - https://raphlinus.github.io/programming/rust/2018/08/17/undefined-behavior.html



Variable Length Arrays are **bad**


- Exhaust stack, linear overflow: write to things following it
- Jump over guard pages and write to things following it
- But easy to find with compiler flag: -Wvla



Variable Length Arrays are **slow**


- While this seems conceptually sound: more instructions to change stack size, it seems like it would be hard to notice.
- But... 13% speed up measured during lib/bch.c VLA removal: https://git.kernel.org/linus/02361bc77888 (Ivan Djelic)

Buffer allocation	Encoding	throughput (Mbit/s)
on-stack, VLA	3988	
on-stack, fixed	4494	
kmalloc	1967	



Switch case fall-through: did I mean it?

- CWE-484 "Omitted Break Statement in Switch"
- Semantic weakness in C ("switch" is just assembly test/jump...)
- Commit logs with "missing break statement": 67



Switch case fall-through: new "statement"

- Use -Wimplicit-fallthrough to add a new switch "statement"
 - Actually a comment, but is parsed by compilers now, following the lead of static checkers
- Mark all non-breaks with a "fall through" comment, for example https://git.kernel.org/linus/4597b62f7a60 (Gustavo A. R. Silva)

Always-initialized local variables: just do it

- CWE-200 "Information Exposure", CWE-457 "Use of Uninitialized Variable"
- gcc -finit-local-vars not upstream
- Clang -fsanitize=init-local not upstream
- CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_...
 - STRUCTLEAK (for structs with __user pointers)
 - STRUCTLEAK_BYREF (when passed into funcs)
 - Soon, plugin to mimic
 finit-local-vars too

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Subject: Re: Fully initialized stack usage

On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 3:15 AM, P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> wrote: > ...

> This experimental patch by Florian Weimer(CC'd) adds an option

- > '-finit-local-vars' to gcc(1) compiler. When a program(or kernel)
- > is built using this option, its automatic(local) variables are > initialized with zero(0). This could significantly reduce the kernel
- > initialised with zero(0). This could significantly reduce the kernel > information leakage issues.

Oh, I love that patch.

THAT is the kind of thing we should do. It's small, it's trivial, and it's done early in the parsing stage, so later stages will almost certainly end up optimizing things away.

• •

Always-initialized local variables: switch gotcha

warning: statement will never be executed [-Wswitch-unreachable]

enum pipe pipe = crtc->pipe; int sprite0_start, sprite1_start; uint32_t dsparb, dsparb2, dsparb3; switch (pipe) { uint32_t dsparb, dsparb2, dsparb3; case PIPE_A: dsparb = I915_READ(DSPARB); dsparb2 = I915_READ(DSPARB2);

Arithmetic overflow detection: gcc?

- gcc's -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow (CONFIG_UBSAN)
 - Only signed. Fast: in the noise. Big: warnings grow kernel image by 6% (aborts grow it by 0.1%)
- But we can use explicit single-operation helpers. To quote Rasmus Villemoes:

```
So is it worth it? I think it is, if nothing else for the documentation
value of seeing

if (check_add_overflow(a, b, &d))
   return -EGOAWAY;
   do_stuff_with(d);

instead of the open-coded (and possibly wrong and/or incomplete and/or
UBsan-tickling)

if (a+b < a)
   return -EGOAWAY;
   do_stuff_with(a+b);</pre>
```

Arithmetic overflow detection: Clang:)

• Clang can do signed and unsigned instrumentation:

-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow

-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow

```
$ clang overflow.c -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow && ./a.out
overflow.c:11:12: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 1 + 2147483647 cannot be represented in type 'int'
-2147483648
```

```
-ftrap-function=abort && ./a.out
```


zsh: abort (core dumped) ./a.out

Bounds checking: explicit checking is slow :(

- Explicit checks for linear overflows of SLAB objects, stack, etc
 - copy_{to,from}_user() checking: <~1% performance hit</pre>
 - strcpy()-family checking: ~2% performance hit
 - memcpy()-family checking: ~1% performance hit
- Can we get better APIs?
 - strncpy() doesn't always NULL terminate, NULL pads entire destination
 - strlcpy() reads source beyond max destination size
 - strscpy() ... okay, I guess?
 - How about memcpy() that takes (and updates?) destination remaining size?


Bounds checking: memory tagging :)

- Hardware memory tagging/coloring is so much faster!
 - SPARC Application Data Integrity (ADI)
 - ARM?
 - Intel?



Control Flow Integrity: indirect calls

 With memory W^X, gaining execution control needs to change function pointers saved in heap or stack, where all type information was lost!



CFI, forward edges: just call pointers :(

void call_one(char *input)

printf("Printing stuff: %s\n", input);

void call_two(void)

```
printf("Eek: don't run me\n");
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
```

void (*func)(char *) = call_ong

```
if (atoi(argv[1]) < 0)
    func = (void *)call_two;</pre>
```

func(argv[0]);

return 0;

Ignore function prototype ...

Normally just a call to a memory address:

```
$ clang demo.c -o demo
$ ./demo 1
Printing stuff: ./demo
$ ./demo -1
Eek: don't run me
$
```

CFI, forward edges: enforce prototype :)

void call_one(char *input)

printf("Printing stuff: %s\n", input);

void call_two(void)

```
printf("Eek: don't run me\n");
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
```

```
void (*func)(char *) = call_on
```

```
if (atoi(argv[1]) < 0)
    func = (void *)call_two;</pre>
```

```
func(argv[0]);
```

return 0;


Ignore function prototype ...

Clang -fsanitize=cfi will check at runtime:

\$ clang demo.c -o demo -flto -fvisibility=hidden -fsanitize=cfi
\$./demo 1
Printing stuff: ./demo
\$./demo -1
Illegal instruction (core dumped)


CFI, backward edges: two stacks

- Clang's Safe Stack
 - Clang: -fsanitize=safe-stack



CFI, backward edges: shadow call stack

- Clang's Shadow Call Stack
 - Clang: -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack
 - Results in two stack registers: sp and unspilled x18



CFI, backward edges: hardware support

- Intel CET: hardware-based read-only shadow call stack
 - Implicit use of otherwise read-only shadow stack during call and ret instructions
- ARM v8.3a Pointer Authentication ("signed return address")
 - New instructions: paciasp and autiasp
 - Clang and gcc: -msign-return-address

+paciasp		
stp	x29, x30,	[sp, #-48]!
mov	x29, sp	
str	w0, [x29,	#28]
mov	w0, #0x0	
ldp	x29, x30,	[sp], #48
+autiasp		
ret		

Where is the Linux kernel now?

- Variable Length Arrays
 - Nearly eradicated from kernel (only handful in crypto remain)
- Explicit switch case fall-through
 - Steady progress on full markings (745 of 2311 remain)
- Always-initialized automatic variables
 - Various partial options, needs more compiler work
- Arithmetic overflow detection
 - Memory allocations now doing explicit overflow detection
 - Needs better kernel support for Clang and gcc
- Bounds checking
 - Crying about performance hits
 - Waiting (im)patiently for hardware support
- Control Flow Integrity: forward edges
 - Need Clang LTO support in kernel, but works on Android
- Control Flow Integrity: backward edges
 - Shadow Call Stack works on Android
 - Waiting (im)patiently for hardware support



Challenges in Kernel Security Development

Cultural: Conservatism, Responsibility, Sacrifice, Patience **Technical**: Complexity, Innovation, Collaboration **Resource**: Dedicated Developers, Reviewers, Testers, Backporters



Thoughts?

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https://outflux.net/slides/2018/lss/danger.pdf

http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/ http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project