A Canonical Event Log Structure for IMA

David Safford and Monty Wiseman
General Electric

August 28, 2018

Secure, Software Defined Analytics & Controls Platform

EDGEos BY GE GLOBAL RESEARCH

https://github.com/edgeos



Currently working on Attestation



IMA Measurement List Desires

1. Scalability!
   - The existing measurement list (and hash table) are big kernel memory leaks
   - The leaks are made worse by incessant violation records (millions - Lawrence Reinert/NCSC)
   - **There is no reason for measurements to remain in the kernel – they're TPM protected**

2. Completeness!
   - We need to attest metadata, since metadata can affect security and IMA policy
   - Owner, group, mode, security labels
   - Make it _much_ easier to add fields in the future

	Local Appraisal	Remote Attestation
Data	**IMA**	**IMA**
Metadata	**EVM**	**???**

3. Standards compliance!
   - Canonical Event Log Format for IMA and other logs
   - A common TLV format will make integrated attestation simpler and more robust
   - If we are going to make a new list format, we might as well directly support the TCG format

4. Bonus!
   - Sequence number for attestation compression/synchronization
   - Timestamp for better event correlation
   - Flexible/Dynamic selection of included fields
   - Don't need to transfer measurement list across kexec!

Canonical Event Log Record



[1] CEL: Defined by the TCG Canonical Event Log specification

CEL Tags and Tag Ranges

Constant	TCG Tag	Description of Value Field
00[1]	RECNUM	Unique Record Number
01	PCR	PCR Index[2]
02	TCG_DIGEST	TCG Digest
03-	CONTENT_TYPE	Type of Content

Constant	CONTENT Type	Description
3	CEL	Content managed by TCG / CEL. Provides information & management of log
4	PCClient-STD	PC Client WG defined encapsulating structure
5	PCClient-TLV	PC Client WG defined using TLV (?)
6	IMA-Legacy	IMA Legacy
7	IMA-TLV	IMA TLV

Digest Field



Event Content Field



Digest Field Calculation



- New Content Types should digest the entire Event Content Field
- Legacy Content Type (e.g., PC Client, IMA-Legacy) may specify a more complex scheme. This is necessary to maintain consistent digest to content mapping.

CEL Management

- Used to Provide information about the Event Log
  Version information -- which spec version
  Time stamp
  Separators (e.g., between firmware and OS)
- Similar to PC Client EV_Separator
- This content is managed / maintained by TCG
- Security-sensitive events are measured
  E.g., Time stamps
- Non-security-sensitive events are not measured
  E.g., Event log (spec) version info

CEL Event Log Example Sequence



Example Event Log Management



IMA-TLV





Defined by IMA (i.e., Constant values may overlap CEL defined constants)

Recommend using same format as CEL Mgmt

Constant	IMA-Content-Tag	Comment
0	FILEPATH	Primitive
1	DATA	Primitive
2	DATAHASH	V is array of Single Digest TLVs
3	DATASIG	V is array of Single Signature TLVs
4	METADATAHASH	V is array of Single Digest TLVs
5	METADATASIG	V is array of Single Signature TLVs
6	OWNER	Primitive
7	GROUP	Primitive
8	MODE	Primitive
9	LABEL	Primitive
A	TIME_STAMP	Primitive
B...	...	...

IMA-TLV Example Event Log



Constants are examples only. These are not the TCG-defined Constants. These are aligned with IMA Digest IDs

IMA Defined Digest ID

Constant	Algorithm Name
10	TPM_ALG_SHA or TPM_ALG_SHA1
11	TPM_ALG_SHA256
12	TPM_ALG_SHA384
13	TPM_ALG_SHA512
14	TPM_ALG_SM3_256
15	TPM_ALG_SHA3_256
16	TPM_ALG_SHA3_384
17	TPM_ALG_SHA3_512
18 – 7F	Reserved

IMA-TLV Measurement



IMA-TLV Record Hash



IMA-Legacy





Defined by IMA
(i.e., Constant values may overlap CEL defined constants)

Constant	IMA-Content-Tag	Description
0	TEMPLATE	String: 'ima' | 'ima-ng' | 'img-sig'
1	d	$Hash_{sha-1}$(file content}
2	n	File Name as byte[]\0 <max 255>
3	d-ng	"SHA-1:" | $hash_{sha-1}$[file content] "SHA-256:" | $hash_{sha-256}$[file content] ...
4	n-ng	UINT16 Len | file name as byte []
5	sig	file signature as byte[]

IMA-Legacy – Template: ima



Template: ima = d | n

Template Hash (value extended) = $hash_{pcrBank}${d | n}

Constant	IMA-Content-Tag	Description
0	TEMPLATE	String: 'ima'
1	d	$Hash_{sha-1}$(file content}
2	n	File Name as byte[]\0 <max 255>





PoC/RFC Patchset

1. Refactoring – new abstraction (“records”) pointing to either TLV or Template
2. Currently config/compile time selection of format, TLV-or-Template
3. Measurement list is truncated on read, hash table is omitted.

Common:
- 280 ima_api.c
- 466 ima_appraise.c
- 634 ima_crypto.c
- 322 ima_fs.c
- 289 ima.h
- 141 ima_init.c
- 494 ima_main.c
- 55 ima_mok.c

1209 ima_policy.c
3890

6134 total

Template:
- 230 ima_fs_template.c
- 201 ima_queue_template.c
- 640 ima_template.c
- 88 ima_template.h
- 390 ima_template_lib.c
- 45 ima_template_lib.h
- 170 ima_kexec.c

1764

TLV
- 105 ima_fs_tlv.c
- 95 ima_queue_tlv.c
- 205 ima_tlv.c
- 75 ima_tlv.h

480



PoC/RFC Patchset - kconfig



Adding a field

```
/* IMA Specific Content Types */
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_PATH          0
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_DATAHASH      1
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_DATASIG       2
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_OWNER         3
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_GROUP         4
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_MODE          5
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_TIMESTAMP     6
#define IMA_TLV_CONTENT_LABEL         7

code to calculate length of the new TLV:
        if (is_selected(IMA_TLV_CONTENT_MODE) && inode)
                l = l + IMA_TLV_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(inode->i_mode);

code to fill in TLV data:
        if (is_selected(IMA_TLV_CONTENT_MODE) && inode) {
                ima_tlv_buf(pos, IMA_TLV_CONTENT_MODE, sizeof(inode->i_mode),
                            (const u8 *)&(inode->i_mode));
                pos = pos + IMA_TLV_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(inode->i_mode);
        }
```

Ima_tlv_selected=<bitmask>

3 ~= ima-ng

7 ~= ima-sig

Demo

```
cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/tlv_runtime_measurements > bindata
cat bindata | ./tlv_dump
...
SEQNUM 00001364 PCRNUM 10 TCG_DIGEST SHA1
280634A43216E1BB7438130B6A6ED95F9ED6F909 PATH
/home/dave/projects/lss2018/tlv_dump DATA_HASH SHA256
D6F820A121A111D2952FBCE85B2985634344A5B57C521A2A267375BE672AE4B6
Digest Matches content <==
Final pcr-10 should be 0E5FB2405486563DC059D43A3D28BD9AF21647DE <==
[root@localhost dave]# tpm2_pcrlist
sha1 :
  0  : c38713029d7433a7be8c5a89dc8660bef5e37899
  1  : 056ad82d0d2e20f3c6541ed67debd0e534c63f55
  2  : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236
  3  : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236
  4  : 220bc46deadfb67faea90c92bece61d6400bbf87
  5  : 647586e80172debe28540589cb252e8cf4ef5570
  6  : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236
  7  : ca5525bfdb2f10814dbd4f69364698b6d8b35dd9
  8  : fde0e8dd62dddf80240309196600 4b21e4398182
  9  : 04337e9370fb1bc022ecc0e1ef60a18845efad35
  10 : 0e5fb2405486563dc059d43a3d28bd9af21647de <==
```

Summary - RFC

1. Desires
    a) Eliminate Memory Leak
    b) Attest metadata
    c) Simplify writing and parsing measurement list
    d) Standards Compliance

2. RFC:
    a) Any reason for TLV-and-Template?
    b) Any in-kernel need for hash table?
    c) Long Term - Deprecate Template?
    d) Other fields desired?
    e) Other comments/suggestions?

Extra Credit

NanoPi Neo Plus2 - A Secure *Pi Platform ($35)



	Raspberry Pi	BeagleBone Black	NanoPi
Protected boot	none	emmc wp	emmc wp
Verified Boot	none	U-boot	U-boot
TPM	none	none	Trustzone fTPM